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National Intelligence Daily

Friday 11 September 1981

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NGA Review Completed



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POLAND: End of Union Congress
Solidarity's increased militancy, which came into clearer focus during the congress, will force the regime to be equally uncompromising during the coming weeks.
In its final day of deliberations, Solidarity yesterday approved a seven-point resolution that included the demand for free parliamentary elections. The resolution called for Solidarity to draft a new electoral law that would allow secret ballots and candidates not affiliated with the official government list. Solidarity leader Walesa also won support for his demand for a stronger central leadership for the union.
Many delegates believe, however, that there will have to be another major dispute with the regime before any further progress is possible. They believe the regime cannot be trusted to negotiate in good faith and will not live up to commitments made during negotiations. 25X1
The regime's options are limited. It cannot appear lenient toward Solidarity's increasingly political behavior or it will risk total alienation from Moscow. It also cannot prevent the second part of the congress without precipitating a domestic explosion.
As Solidarity prepares for the second part of its congress in two weeks, it will resume negotiations with the regime on demands for greater access to the media and for more worker self-management. Little progress is likely, however, and tensions generally will be high. The possibility of a strike by radio and television workers remains, but Walesa probably will argue against any major protest action before the union has completed its elections and set out its program.
Soviet Reaction
Moscow's angry rejection of Solidarity's "appeal to the peoples of Eastern Europe" vaguely warned of a
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
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mounting wave of indignation but gave action on the part of the USSR is immi Solidarity's statement "interference i of other peoples," TASS repeated earli the Polish union is intent on vanquish restoring capitalism, and altering War policy.	nent. Calling n the affairs er charges that ing the party,	25X1
Moscow's criticism probably will authoritative public assessment of the may not come for several days. The So in Warsaw probably used his meeting ye chief Kania to state formally Moscow's	latest events viet Ambassador sterday with party	


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CHAD: Insurgents Take Towns Forces of insurgent leader Habre have seing Iriba in eastern Chad in what may be the opening long-awaited anti-Libyan campaign.		25X1
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The capture of the towns, however so resents Habre's most significant military the Libyans ousted his forces from N'Djacember. Until recently he had been accurant and supplies from foreign benefactors—Arab countries—in preparation for launce operations. Habre's guerrillas eventually should put pressure on the Libyans and on Presifeeble coalition government, but they will by themselves to compel Tripoli's larger armed forces to leave the country. At preparation for launce opposition. Further insurgent gains, he embolden many Chadians disgruntled over presence of some 6,000 Libvan troops to to oppose them. Sustained guerrilla activity in eas undercut efforts by France—which halted after President Mitterrand was elected—Libyan troop withdrawals. Tripoli no do to Habre and the threat he poses to the as a pretext for keeping troops in Chad	ry success since amena last De- mulating arms mainly moderate ching insurgent de be able to dent Goukouni's ll not be able and better bresent Habre's anti-Libyan bwever, could the continued look for ways stern Chad could lits aid to Habre to encourage bubt would point Goukouni regime	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X
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AFGHANISTAN: Army Problems

The callup of reservists who completed military service before October 1978, announced by the Afghan Government on Monday, will do little to remedy the Army's serious manpower shortage. Young men are responding by fleeing Kabul, one of the few places where the government still has enough control to enforce the new order. The few reservists who may be forced into the Army are likely to be mutinous, and many probably will desert.

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The Army's ineffectiveness is reflected in a recent Defense Ministry report indicating that the government now controls only 25 percent of the country's 291 administrative districts, down from 32 percent in June. The report says that the government controls parts of another 18 percent of the districts. Four provinces are acknowledged to be completely controlled by the insurgents; in previous reports the government claimed to control at least part of every province.

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CYPRUS: Greek Counterproposals

The Greek Cypriot proposals submitted to the Turkish Cypriots on Wednesday represent another small step forward in the UN-sponsored talks, but the two sides remain far apart. In response to the Turkish plan presented last month, the Greeks have offered some concessions on constitutional issues that would give the Turkish Cypriot minority strong representation in the island's future legislature and executive. The Greek side avoided a direct reaction to Turkish territorial proposals, commenting only that this matter is negotiable as long as a large number of the approximately 160,000 Greek refugees now in the south are allowed to return to their former homes and are put under Greek jurisdiction. The UN representative at the talks has apparently decided that he must play a more active role in the negotiations in order to bridge the differences, and he may unveil his own set of proposals in October.

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The replacement of Foreign Trade Mannounced yesterday, reflects Beijing's stalling professional rather than politically economic policy posts. Li has actificated to decentralize control over fore Tuobin, his successor, has served in vations since 1953. Beijing followed a sits selection of new ministers for light ways, and aircraft production.	s emphasis on intical figures in ively opposed ended in the contract of the co	n- n f- ng si- in
CHINA: Nuclear Submarine Construction		
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China's first two Han-class submarines are fully operational, but powered unit, a Xia-class ballistic-mis is still being fitted out.	its third nuclea	ar-

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,	SPECIAL ANALYSIS		
	FRANCE: Socialist Proposals To Be Test	ced	25X1
	President Mitterrand remains determined to domestic program rapidly, despite mounting ecory The Socialist-controlled National Assembly, who day, probably will approve Mitterrand's proposed of grace" enjoyed by his young administration of much longer.	nomic difficulties. ich convened on Tues- als, but the "state	25X1
	The President and Prime Minister M good marks for overall performance in they have lost some ground in the last cording to one survey, 47 percent of elapprove of Socialist economic policies, disapprove. Unemployment and inflation continued to rise, and Socialist effort sponsibility—for example, by blaming f Giscard's policies and high US interest will be less successful in coming month	the polls, although two months. Ac- igible voters and 35 percent however, have so to avoid re- former President ratesprobably	
	Mitterrand apparently believes that ficult, if not impossible, to improve to uation significantly within the next since Leading French economists, in fact, presult rise from 1.8 million now to 2 million the year. Mitterrand's strategy, the use his present popularity to achieve Strategy before the economic and, as a result, progets worse and makes reform impossible. The Socialist Agenda	the economic sit- x to 18 months. edict unemployment lion by the end herefore, is to socialist reforms solitical situation	25 X 1
	The Socialist Agenda The National Assembly will take acongovernment proposals to abolish the legalize private radio stations, improvimmigrant workers, and loosen Paris' st governmental powers by increasing the producils. Mitterrand's first president on 24 September, will be the centerpied campaign to mobilize public support.	death penalty, we the status of cranglehold on cowers of regional cial news conference	e, 25X1
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The first real challenge for Mitte however, is expected in early October, Assembly begins debate on his proposal most of the remaining privately owned jor industrial concerns. Most business center-right political parties will oppose	when the National s to nationalize banks and nine mass leaders and the	25X1
Some Socialist moderates may prival Mitterrand, claiming that the national stroy the competitive advantages of the and damage the economy. Mitterrand also sniping from leftwing Socialists and his Communist partners, who are concerned cautious.	izatīons will de- e private companies so may encounter is recalcitrant	25X1
The nationalization program probabilistic tually intact from the Socialist-control the debate will almost certainly cost of its popularity and perhaps further to both domestic and internationalin further formance.	olled Assembly, but the government some weaken confidence	; ;
Controversies also will develop as to transform Socialist rhetoric into coreform proposals, for example, may respince to the same time, the National Assembly energy policy promised for October appearesult in a nuclear program nearly as a Giscard's—to the disappointment of the militant antinuclear movement.	oherent policy. Tault in significant n-income groups. Y debate on nuclear ears likely to ambitious as increasingly	
Meanwhile, Mitterrand may be faced lessness in the pro-Socialist and Commulabor unions. Both have issued veiled might resort to demonstrations and stranands are not met regarding wage hikes hours, large-scale job creation programunion participation in management decision.	inist-controlled warnings that they ikes if their de- , reduced working ms, and increased	
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Mitterrand, moreover, reportedly i the lack of discipline within the gover that the contradictory policies of some demoralize France if left unchecked.	nment, and he	fears
Parties in Search of a Role		
The major political parties will reand assess their leadership for the fire Socialist electoral victories. Each one problems:	st time since	the
The victorious Socialists mus- depleted leadership ranks and supportive of, and yet indepen- government.	establish a re	ole
The Communists are still wrest consequences of their poor ele and are trying to maintain the tinctive identity while partic government.	ectoral showing e party's dis-	g
The Gaullists, now in the opportunity of their party as a broad-based responsible to their party as a broad-based responsible to the soother of the soothe	try to rebuild movement and to mong some Gauli	o list
Supporters of Giscard, who rempopular figure on the center-whether to construct a tightly continue as a collection of fathe risk that some might strikes socialists.	right, must ded y knit party on actions, taking	cide r g
Mitterrand probably will succeed in center-right opposition and his Communistical ance until early next year. Barring revolt among disparate elements of the Smajor parts of his program for a socialisably will be in place before then.	st allies off an unlikely Socialist Party	
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
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